Environmental collaborative governance arrangements have the potential to build social capital, leading to longterm cooperation among parties with a history of conflict over water use, in particular in irrigation, hydropower production and riverine wildlife habitat. Previous research on social capital in the context of collaborative governance has emphasized small-scale grassroots initiatives where actors hold common membership in civic associations. This study explores a large-scale policy level collaborative arrangement as a case of collective action facilitated by elements of social capital, with a special emphasis on the concept of the institution as social capital. The Platte River Recovery Implementation Program is the basis for initial findings that social capital formation and cooperative implementation of innovative approaches to water policy can occur at both the local action and large-scale policy levels of collaboration.
Introduction
In the area of water policy, it has been apparent for some time that most issues are too complex for management under separate jurisdictions. Moreover, the multiple uses to which limited supplies of water are put -irrigation, hydropower production, recreation and other human needs, as well as aquatic habitat for wildlife -guarantee that conflicts will ensue among multiple users and negotiated solutions will become more prevalent. Sabatier et al. (2005) argued that a new governmental approach to watershed decision making based on collaboration would need to overcome the self-interested behaviors of stakeholders and to develop norms of cooperation. One way to insure that collective solutions are congruent with the self-interest of stakeholders is for participants to interact over a period of time, increasing the likelihood that they will seek mutually beneficial solutions. Thus 'social capital' is a key factor in promoting environmental collaboration.
Another reason for the emergence of environmental collaborative governance was the increase in litigation following the passage of major environmental legislation in the 1970s. In the context of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (1973) , collaboration has been a major strategy to avert a crisis of enforcement. A growing concern about the social, political and economic costs of delay or outright cancellation of land and water development projects created opposition to efforts to restore ecosystems and protect threatened and endangered species, and a reluctance to list additional species. Collaborative governance was promoted as a way to avoid a political backlash against the ESA by engaging stakeholders in developing strategies to prevent further degradation of already damaged ecosystems.
As Sax (2000 Sax ( : 2382 summed up the challenges associated with balancing environmental and economic values, such initiatives 'provide instructive lessons in the opportunities and perils in seeking to shift an entrenched developmental economy to one in which biodiversity values, both in maintenance and restoration, are sought to be given priority while respecting the importance of the (West) region's traditional economy'.
Our research on the Platte River Recovery Implementation Program (PRRIP) (Reed et al., 2012 (Reed et al., , 2013 documented how implementation during the initial period of the Cooperative Agreement resulted in innovative approaches for retiming river water for flow augmentation, generating water resources for both irrigation and riverine habitat for endangered and threatened bird species. The focus of our current work is on the importance of social capital in fostering cooperative action in this regional collaborative endeavor.
Negotiations over the PRRIP date back to the early 1990s, when major water projects in Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska were delayed or cancelled because of conflicts with the ESA. The PRRIP emerged from struggles to meet the needs of multiple economic and environmental stakeholders for the limited waters of the Platte River ecosystem. The governors of Nebraska, Colorado and Wyoming joined the US Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) as signatories to a 1997 Cooperative Agreement forming the basis for the PRRIP that officially began on 1 January 2007. From these struggles, a unique collaborative model has taken shape. Federal and state agencies, power and irrigation districts, natural resource districts and several environmental organizations are all represented on the Governance Committee (GC) charged with overseeing the implementation of the PRRIP.
Some scholars evaluate collaborative outcomes in terms of restoring natural processes, such as hydrological cycles in riverine ecosystems (Layzer, 2008) . We adopt a social outcome measure, however, to emphasize that finding better approaches for managing natural resources depends on finding effective ways for individuals to work together (Wondolleck & Yafee, 2000) . As Rogers & Weber (2010) pointed out, environmental outcome measures may target indicators of programmatic success; but precisely because these measures are grounded in the legalities of statutory compliance, they obscure other types of outcomes:
'The frustration is compounded by the realization that in situations employing collaborative governance arrangements, especially those in watershed management initiatives that explicitly recognize the interconnectedness and interdependency among public problems, it is not clear that the old ways of conceptualizing outcomes and performance apply, or if they do apply, they only succeed in capturing a limited part of the outcome picture' (Rogers & Weber, 2010: 547) .
Social capital is a key social outcome of collaborative governance, especially in community-based, citizen-initiated watershed councils. As the following section shows, literature on social capital and voluntary collective action stresses the importance of small-scale, informal arrangements in forming relationships that foster cooperation. As Putnam & Feldstein (2003: 275) put it, 'Smaller is better for social capital creation.' Our research on the PRRIP, however, suggests that social capital can also develop in regional collaborative programs. The objective of this study is to further research the important role of social capital in sustaining large-scale policy level environmental collaborative governance.
Social capital in large-scale collaboration
One of the commonly cited precursors of voluntary collective action is social capital. In his classic analysis of social capital, Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) explained the significance of social capital as allowing citizens to resolve dilemmas of collective action by providing social norms and networks to enforce compliance with collectively desirable behavior. Raymond (2006: 39) stated 'the more individuals interact and build up norms of reciprocity, the more voluntary collaboration is likely to occur.' Portes (1998: 7) asserted that 'whereas economic capital is in people's bank accounts and human capital is inside their heads, social capital inheres in the structure of their relationships. ' Morris et al. (2013: 7) defined social capital as 'willingness to work with others in a community to accomplish a common goal. ' In research on common pool resource (CPR) institutions, Ostrom (2000: 183) found that social capital facilitates local self-organizing processes:
'For farmers to consider constituting themselves into even a loose form of association to construct an irrigation system they would need to have secure enough land tenure to believe they can reap longterm benefits from an investment. They would need to have established a sufficient sense of community that they can engage in a full array of face-to-face relationships that value keeping promises an asset of considerable importance' (Emphasis added).
A sense of community thus builds social capital, including trustworthiness. Social capital is a set of prescriptions, values and relationships created by individuals in the past that can be used in the future to help overcome social dilemmas (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008) .
Many of the social dilemmas faced by communities involve the exploitation of water, grazing, fishing and forest 'commons' by locals in the absence of common norms and rules for allocating natural resources. Although the emphasis is on self-governance, the CPR framework acknowledges that institutions can create deterrents to exploitation and increase the likelihood of collective action (Ahn & Ostrom, 2008) . Including institutions as factors in social capital formation allows us to extend social capital theory to situations, like the PRRIP, in which the FWS can use the ESA to discourage water providers and states from abandoning negotiations. Freeman's (2010) history of the PRRIP concluded that the parties were able to create an effective governance organization to manage the Platte River water commons, but underscored the importance of the FWS in keeping the parties at the table:
'Therefore either way the rational actor (individual or organizational) -with open access to the resource and no certainty of regulated cooperation by others by virtue of membership in an effective encompassing governance organization -will refrain from investing in a collective remedy and choose to be either a free-rider on the contributions of others or a fellow competitor in the race to collective ruin' (Freeman, 2010: 8) .
As the following section shows, the FWS accepted a basin-wide plan for protection of endangered and threatened bird species and restoration of critical habitat on the Platte River, allowing irrigation and hydropower projects to proceed for a 13-year period. Regulatory certainty was an incentive for water providers and states to agree to specific reductions in shortages to target flows (defined contributions of water and land) as well as offsets to new depletions to ground water occurring after 1997.
Identifying the importance of institutions as social capital allows us to explore social capital in a large-scale program like the PRRIP. Scholars of collaborative approaches to watershed management have tended to focus on community-based, grassroots initiatives (Weber, 2003) . Those who study large-scale efforts suggest that the incentives in regional settings may differ from those at smaller scales. Large-scale settings are less likely to conform to characteristics of small-scale settings, such as trusting resource users (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005) . The assumption is that social capital is confined to small-scale, informal, citizen-initiated collaborative efforts. In a similar vein, Robinson et al. (2011: 852) distinguished between policy and local action levels of collaboration, observing that local action level projects occur because key individuals acting as private citizens, 'possess social networks and strong connections to place that allows them to bring people to address a common cause, even when those participants come from different ideological perspectives. ' Furthermore, Margerum (2008) stated that at the local action level, stakeholders are the agents of change. They are embedded in, and share a sense of, common place. Change happens through networks of personal influence. At the policy level, on the other hand, collaboration is more likely to address issues of regional significance, and to involve more complex institutional settings. Management arrangements for implementation of formal negotiated agreements are also different. At the local action level, the same participants are involved at the consensus-building and implementation phases. At the policy level, high-level representatives designate key staff to carry out negotiated agreements among coalitions of stakeholders, resulting in a 'two table problem' in which stakeholders must seek consensus within their own organizations as well as among staff representing other organizations.
The formality of policy level collaborative institutions include legal mandates, such as the ESA, suggesting that large-scale collaboration, such as the PRRIP, is unlikely to benefit from social capital. As Ahn & Ostrom (2008) have argued, however, institutions are a form of social capital in the CPR framework, supplementing trustworthiness and networks as influential factors in collective action situations. Raymond (2006) affirms that institutional mechanisms limit free-riding and impose sanctions on those who stop cooperating. These mechanisms ensure that defections are unlikely to occur and that contributions will reap benefits for all parties involved in the collective action situation.
The importance of institutions as social capital is particularly relevant in situations like the PRRIP. Freeman (2010) pointed out that protecting endangered species and restoring their critical habitat is a collective good. The value of contributions and benefits to the participants is more difficult to calculate than common property, such as water for irrigation, where people who are participating will benefit directly. The role of the FWS as an institution is to provide a compelling rationale to produce and sustain a collective good.
Institutional mechanisms alone are insufficient for collective action. As Ahn & Ostrom (2008) have stated, trustworthiness and network structure are also separate, but related, forms of social capital. Nevertheless, even Putnam & Feldstein (2003) emphasize that civil society alone cannot solve public problems and that government support of participatory strategies is crucial for reaching common goals. We infer from these findings that both formal collaborative arrangements and private citizeninitiated voluntary collaboration can reap the benefits of institutions as social capital.
Our focus on institutions as social capital draws on the work of Heikkila & Gerlak (2005) , who applied the CPR framework in complex settings. One aspect of social capital in particular is relevant for our purposes: a history of interaction among organizational actors. Heikkila & Gerlak (2005) refer to previous efforts by organizational and agency leaders to work toward collective action as institutional capital. While this idea is different from the concept of institutions as social capital, it is obviously similar in the sense that a history of agencies working together can build social capital among leaders who were parties to the original negotiations. Those leaders play a vital role in fostering a culture of trustworthiness and reciprocity that is 'passed down' to designated staff members. Current members of the PRRIP GC have built on that initial stock of social capital, as will be apparent from the following case description.
The history of negotiations leading to the 1997 Cooperative Agreement is beyond the scope of this study. Our focus is on the implementation of the PRRIP during the initial years of the first 13-year program increment. While details about the leadership provided by federal agency heads and governors of Colorado, Wyoming and Nebraska in initiating the Cooperative Agreement would enhance understanding of institutional capital formation, the technicalities of implementation are complex enough to warrant a separate study. We present evidence of social capital in facilitating a process for reconciling opposing views about habitat restoration on the Platte River. While other short-term outcomes related to achieving PRRIP water and land milestones provide additional evidence consistent with the CPR approach to social capital, we focus on this aspect of the PRRIP because it has the greatest potential to generate conflict and produce defections from collective action.
Case study description
The PRRIP was the result of a Cooperative Agreement signed in 1997 by the governors of Nebraska, Colorado and Wyoming, the FWS and the BOR in the US Department of Interior. It followed years of preliminary study triggered by listings of the whooping crane and interior least tern as endangered species, and the piping plover as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. The FWS had also designated the 'Big Bend' of the Platte between Lexington and Denman, NE, as critical habitat for the whooping crane. These listings and the designation led to major revisions to, or outright cancellations of, water diversion and storage projects in all three states.
The process of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission relicensing of the Kingsley Dam, operated by the Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District (CNPPID) required consultation with the FWS and, ultimately, involvement by the CNPPID in a river basin-wide collaborative program. The CNPPID constructed the Tri-County Canal system, a major 're-plumbing' of the river for surface water irrigation and hydropower production. In addition, an extensive system of dams and reservoirs constructed by the BOR on the North Platte River in Wyoming for power generation and irrigation, as well as intensive water development of the South Platte River in Colorado for municipalities on the Front Range, coincided with changes in sediment load, river form and function, invasive species of vegetation along the channel, and a reduction in the magnitude and duration of peak flow events originating in the Rocky Mountains. The FWS calculated that reductions in shortages to target flows amounting to hundreds of thousands of acre feet 1 of river water per year were needed to protect endangered species and restore the critical habitat.
After years of contentious negotiations, both sides gave a little as the states and water users agreed to 'milestones' or defined contributions of water and land to secure regulatory certainty. In order to gain water and habitat for the species, the FWS approved a basin-wide biological opinion allowing the three states to proceed with existing water projects for a period of 13 years. Implementation of the Platte River recovery plan under Section 4(f) of the ESA, 16 USC § 1533(f) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to 'procure the services of public and private agencies, individuals and institutions,' and their advice is not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Record of Decision for the PRRIP (2006b) states that the Program 'serves as the ESA Reasonable and Prudent Alternative (RPA) to avoid jeopardy for previously completed consultations.' Furthermore, the PRRIP (2006a) document assigns authority to the FWS to determine if the Program is providing ESA compliance, and if consultation with the GC fails to resolve the matter then the Program is terminated.
Funds for the PRRIP come from BOR appropriations and financial contributions from Wyoming and Colorado. Contributions from Nebraska are in the form of land for habitat and water stored in an Environmental Account in Lake McConaughy behind Kingsley Dam, and a portion of non-irrigation season natural inflows from water retiming. Colorado and Wyoming also contribute water, and Wyoming also contributes land. A financial management entity, the Nebraska Community Foundation, collects and distributes funds including payments to Program staff and contractors. The GC approves all projects and budgets, while the signatories approve expenditures.
The GC consists of representatives of states, federal agencies, environmental groups, water users and other local stakeholders. The governors of the three states (signatories to the Cooperative Agreement) select representatives to the GC. The Secretary of Interior (also a signatory) selects members from the FWS and BOR. Members representing environmental entities share two votes: The Crane Trust, The Nature Conservancy, Audubon Nebraska, and Audubon's Rowe Sanctuary. The National and Nebraska Wildlife Federations are associated with The Crane Trust. Upper Platte water users elect their representative in a specially convened meeting. The South Platte Water Related Activities Program designates a representative of the Colorado water users. CNPPID and the Nebraska Public Power District, plus two Platte Basin Natural Resource Districts share one vote.
GC members appoint their own staff representatives to serve on advisory committees: one on land acquisition for habitat restoration, one on water conservation and development projects, and one on implementing an adaptive management plan. An Independent Scientific Advisory Committee provides advice on science protocols. Executive Director Jerry Kenny formed the Headwaters Corporation, a 1 One acre foot is 1,233.48 m 3 . C. Reed et al. / Water Policy 17 (2015) [472] [473] [474] [475] [476] [477] [478] [479] [480] [481] [482] [483] private consulting firm, as the contracting arm to provide Executive Office staff, manage day-to-day implementation, and advise and assist the GC and associated advisory committees. EO staff, including three wildlife biologists, a bio-systems engineer, a land/water acquisition specialist, two land management specialists and a natural resources specialist who facilitates the adaptive management plan, work in the Kearney, NE, office. Four additional members are located in the Denver, CO, office, including a hydrologist and three water resources engineers (see https//www.platteriverprogram.org) (Figure 1) .
When the PRRIP was first established there were numerous technical and scientific uncertainties about how the system needed to be managed to meet the economic, social and ecological goals of the program members. A key component of the agreement was inclusion of an adaptive management process where outcomes of management alternatives would be evaluated in a monitoring and research context. Water users initially objected to the idea of adaptive management experiments that might lead the FWS to demand higher defined water contributions during the first 13-year program increment. In order to reach a cooperative agreement, the parties drafted language that separated the results of adaptive management monitoring and experiments from the achievement of defined water and land contributions, i.e., program milestones. They postponed their 'day of reckoning' until negotiations over a second program increment.
According to Freeman's (2010) meticulous records of the negotiations, the states and water users feared that the FWS would use the results of adaptive management experiments to justify larger target flows in order to restore a natural flow regime. The states and water users favored less waterintensive management actions such as using off-channel sand and gravel pits as nesting sites for the interior least tern and piping plover. Determination of program sufficiency under the Endangered Species Act was up to the FWS; however, the adaptive management language in the Cooperative Agreement was a major step in building social capital. Both sides proposed a set of priority hypotheses with the understanding that GC members would commit themselves to supporting the results. As Freeman (2010: 367) explained:
'An adaptive management plan had to do far more than test hypotheses and draw reasoned conclusions; it had to incorporate a way of living together by defining mutually acceptable ways to disagree within an uncomfortable, deeply divided Platte Basin community whose members were all caught in the same political-legal trap. Adaptive management issues were not so much about any particular concept, principle or procedure. The central issue was how will adaptive management work in a regulatory environment where the states and federal communities had incompatible policy positions and program compliance was at stake?' (Emphasis added).
The adaptive management process could undermine important stakeholder positions, and thereby arouse tensions, create controversy and possibly prevent agreement on a second program increment. For these reasons, we focus on this aspect of the PRRIP, instead of other salient features such as water retiming projects and land acquisition for habitat. It is a critical case of how social capital can facilitate cooperative action: if it is possible in this context, it is likely to work in other less contentious parts of the program. One complicating factor is that the language in the Cooperative Agreement insulates states and water users from the institutional leverage used by the FWS to reach a consensus on water and land milestones. That institutional leverage reduced regulatory uncertainty as a basis for facilitating cooperative action; however, the FWS agreed to postpone policy decisions based on the adaptive management experiments until the end of the first program increment. The role of the FWS as an institution is therefore more nuanced than that of a regulator employing deterrents to exploitation or defection. The agency is also a member of the GC's social network and is expected to act in good faith.
Findings
The Executive Director's Office facilitated a process in which GC members agreed on a number of 'big questions' based on priority hypotheses in the adaptive management plan to be answered through scientific study that incorporated competing strategies for critical habitat management: restoring the natural flow regime of the Platte versus relying primarily on human intervention using mechanical methods. The FWS and environmental representatives to the GC favor the first approach, while states and water users defend the second strategy. The natural flow regime model requires the release of 'short duration high flows' from the Kingsley Dam upstream of an area extending from Lexington to Chapman, NE (known as the 'Associated Habitat' area), in addition to sediment augmentation and removal of invasive weeds that have stabilized the river banks and channel features (Table 1) .
Simulated natural flows would hypothetically widen river channels and build in-channel sandbars high enough for tern and plover nests (PRRIP, 2012) . The opposing approach favored by the states and water users is to rely on gravel pits along the Platte, as well as man-made sandbars in the river channel. Results of these adaptive management studies will have major implications for how the GC manages the Platte River for endangered species. The FWS originally proposed target flows that states and water users argued would require irrigators to take so much land out of agricultural production it would virtually destroy the rural economic base of the state. The formation of social capital in this situation thus depends on GC members being committed to following the adaptive management protocol. Initial results are inconclusive, but we offer a cautious assessment of progress.
To date, the GC has agreed with recommendations of the Independent Scientific Advisory Committee that inconclusive results warrant further study. For example, the data suggest that short duration high flows (SDHF) may not build in-channel sandbars high enough to meet program habitat suitability criteria for nesting least terns and piping plovers (PRRIP, 2013) . The Executive Director's Office has suggested that these results do not mean the program should abandon attempts to make SDHF releases, noting 'there are other hypothesized benefits of SDHF releases including maintaining wide, unvegetated channels for whooping cranes' (PRRIP, 2013: 11) . The fact that GC members representing states and water users are willing to extend these experiments suggests that they have achieved norms of mutual trust and reciprocity tied to social capital formation.
The GC could reject the conditions of a second program increment if, in their judgment, the FWS mandates unreasonable new defined contributions of water and land. The potential for continued collaboration rests ultimately on continued calculations by stakeholders that the alternative would be much worse for them. Separate consultations by the FWS with project sponsors under Section 7 of the ESA would likely result in greater costs in terms of water and land contributions for individual water users than a collective agreement. One reason for optimism is the social capital already accumulated within the GC as a result of short-term successes in meeting program milestones during the first increment. Recent agreement on a significant water retiming project is one such outcome: the J-2 Re-regulating Reservoir will reduce shortages to target flows during bird migrations as well as provide water during the irrigation season.
This water project is sponsored by the CNPPID and funded by the PRRIP. CNPPID, PRRIP and the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NDNR) have entered into a Water Service Agreement making CNPPID responsible for the permitting, design, construction and operation of a retiming reservoir. PRRIP and NDNR will bear most of the costs, divided approximately 75% and 25%, respectively. This retiming project is estimated to yield about 30,000 acre feet 2 per year for the PRRIP to meet target flows and 10,000 acre feet 3 per year for the state to offset depletions to groundwater from new (post-1997) wells. The first program 'milestone' for water is to reduce the deficit to target flows annually by 130,000 4 to 150,000 5 acre feet by 2017, the end of the first increment of the PRRIP. The initial water contributions account for 80,000 acre feet 6 per year, leaving 50-70,000 acre feet 7 per year to meet the milestone. Thus this 'small win' of 30,000 acre feet per year reflects a major step.
Creation of social capital to date is an investment in the success of future negotiations. The influence of institutions as social capital -in this case the FWS -is a major factor. Other forms of social capital are also important, however, and we want to emphasize their role in the case of the PRRIP. The CPR framework also included trustworthiness and social structures or networks as additional types of social capital. Viewing the GC as a network extends the usual connotation in the social capital literature of social networks as based on common membership in civic associations. Obviously, since GC members come from three states (albeit contiguous) and meet only quarterly, the basis for their relationships is going to be different. A more formal network, such as the GC, requires more than periodic public meetings to build social capital. The role of Headwaters Corporation staff is crucial in this regard, because of the way in which they have structured quarterly meetings.
The GC meets quarterly at locations that rotate across the three states. Each meeting starts at 2:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday and adjourns at noon on Wednesday. This format was explicitly adopted because it allows members to continue discussions informally over dinner and to build relationships. This schedule is a tradition carried over from the lengthy negotiation process leading up to the start of the PRRIP in 2007. The agenda for each meeting includes reports from the advisory committees, as well as action items. The decision process is by consensus. Nine out of ten votes are needed to move an action item forward, but any one of the signatories (federal and state members) can exercise a veto; however, when an impasse occurs, the GC sends a contentious issue back to the advisory committee for further discussion and research. This informal process helps to build trust among the other participants (Reed et al., 2012) .
Conclusions and implications
The PRRIP is still in the early stages of implementation and more in-depth research would provide details about the social relationships formed within the governance process of the PRRIP. Data on questions such as whether members have contact with one another during the interludes between GC meetings, whether those contacts involve interactions between water users and the FWS or environmental representatives, whether the basis for contact is social or professional, whether GC members rely on one another for advice on problems outside the PRRIP, and whether the frequency and/or depth of those contacts has increased over time would fill gaps in our current research. We also need further investigation of the influence of institutions as social capital by monitoring GC compliance with the ESA. We have argued that the authority of the FWS to mandate separate consultations for individual water projects in all three states has served as a deterrent to defections of water users from the Cooperative Agreement that created the PRRIP. At the same time, a basin-wide approach has benefits not only for the three states and water users but also for environmental organizations whose members value a regional, ecosystem-wide approach to protecting endangered species and their critical habitat. For its part, the FWS wants to avoid the time, costs and uncertainties associated with multiple law suits. In short, mandates are only one source of institutional influence; the FWS has avoided using its 'regulatory hammer,' and has adopted instead a more nuanced approach of accepting progress toward compliance in several program increments. It remains to be seen if data from the adaptive management plan leads the FWS to modify its preference of restoring a natural flow regime to the river.
The evidence from this case study suggests that the elements of social capital identified in the CPR framework, especially institutions as social capital, can lead to cooperative action in large-scale environmental collaborative institutions. The assumption in the literature that social capital is associated mainly with local, small-scale, citizen-initiated efforts makes sense if the source of social capital is limited to overlapping membership in local civic associations. Such a restrictive definition, however, limits research on the potential of social capital to improve how individuals can work together to find better approaches for managing natural resources. If, as we asserted at the outset, the benefits of social capital can extend beyond local grassroots initiatives, then researchers need to identify more cases where social capital facilitates self-governance even in a complex collaborative governance setting.
